The authors may be contacted at adabalen@worldbank.org. recent, and persistent downward mobility increases support for redistribution more. A number of extensions and checks are done by, among others, taking into account systematic bias in perceived mobility experience, considering an alternative definition of redistributive preferences, and exploring the severity of omitted variable bias problems. Overall, the results are robust.
I. Introduction
Whether we support income redistribution depends on not only how well off our parents were or how egalitarian the society we grew up in (predetermined factors of income), but also the bad luck and the successes and the hardships that have shaped our lives (mobility experiences).
1 As Piketty (1995) suggests, and the empirical literature confirms, our past mobility experiences refine our beliefs in the relative importance of hard work and luck, which affects our expectations of future income and, in turn, determines our support for redistribution.
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The literature is scant, however, on how we learn from these mobility experienceshow the particulars of fortunes and hardships affect our support for redistribution. The timing of hardships, for example, is likely to matter: Being unemployed ten years ago possibly nudges us to support redistribution, but not as much as being unemployed last year does. The intensity of hardships matters too (going through hardships in which we had to cut down on food consumption to survive matters more than being unemployed with benefits), so does its persistence (ten-year unemployment in the past ten years increases support for redistribution more than one-year unemployment does).
In this paper, we examine how these particulars of mobility experiences affect support for redistribution in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. We use the Life in Transition Surveys Using these labor-market and life histories, we construct measures of intensity, timing, and persistence of personal history of mobility and we examine how these particulars of mobility affect support for redistribution.
Countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia offer an interesting case to study how personal mobility affects support for redistribution: These countries were command economies that enjoyed strong support for redistribution but had to go through structural reforms, exposing their citizens to economic shocks that are, to some extent, beyond the control of any individual. 3 The states provided education, housing, and healthcare services;
citizens enjoyed heavily subsidized basic-and consumer goods; and most people worked for the governments or state-owned enterprises (Szelenyi and Kostello, 1998; Mikhalev, 2003) .
Then, in the early 1990s, most of these countries embarked on structural reforms (they liberalized, among others, price regulation, labor markets, exchange rate regimes, and trade policies), which increased income inequality and unemployment rates. Some skilled workers enjoyed higher salaries and more secured jobs Lippoldt, 1996, 1997) , but many people not only lost their jobs, but also lost welfare benefits as the states trimmed social safety nets (Kapstein and Mandelbaum, 1997) . A new pattern of social stratification emerged:
a new elite class (mostly new capitalists), a middle class (people in the managerial and professional jobs), a lower class (mostly blue-collar workers), and a socially deprived marginal class (Mikhalev, 2003) . Haphazard redistribution of the states' assets and rising income inequality polarized societies as the losers in this transition outnumbered the few, but wealthy and powerful, elite, which exposed people in Eastern Europe and Central Asia to diverse personal mobility experiences (Mikhalev, 2003) .
These mobility experiences varied across time and space. Earlier in the transition period from 1989 until 1995, most of these countries had fallen into recession. Some 3 Some studies show support for redistribution in socialist countries is high, which may be caused by socialist cultural heritage (Corneo, 2001) , behavioral norms (Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999) , and the direct effect of communism (Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, 2006) . Corneo and Gruner (2002) (World Bank, 2008) . 4 Earlier, and partial, reforms, created some early winners and losers in some countries; later and more comprehensive reforms even more gainers and losers (Mikhalev et al., 2003) -people in these countries have diverse personal mobility experiences, which we examine in this paper to learn how these mobility experiences affect support for redistribution.
We define support for redistribution, the dependent variable, as an that indicator equals one if an individual thinks that the state should be strongly involved in "reducing the gap between the rich and the poor". As measures of downward mobility, we use a section on labor market and life histories in LITS I, which includes a set of questions on mobility experiences such as whether an individual had to accept wage cuts in a particular year from 1989 to 2005, whether she had to sell some of her household assets, and whether she had to respond to shocks by cutting down food consumption. 5 First, we construct three measures of mobility by intensity for each individual and each of the years: (1) whether an individual experienced any type of shocks, (2) whether an individual experienced labor market related shocks only, and (3) whether an individual responded to shocks by taking extreme measures.
Then, we summarize each of the measures by adding up the number of years an individual had experienced downward mobility during the seventeen-year period. 6 (The measures are, therefore, the number of years an individual experienced downward mobility by intensity.) 4 The figures are in constant US$ equivalent of purchasing power parity. 5 See LITS (2006) for more details of this survey. We exclude Mongolia and Turkey to focus on the 27 former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; we also exclude mobility experiences in 2006 to make sure we examine the effects of past mobility experiences only. 6 See Appendix 1 for the details on how we construct all variables.
For the timing of downward mobility, we divide the seventeen-year period into several subperiods and create measures of mobility for each (a larger estimate of downward mobility for later periods, for example, indicates more recent downward mobility affects support for redistribution more than downward mobility a long time ago does). For the persistence of downward mobility, we create measures of mobility by the number of years an individual experienced shocks (a larger estimate for more frequent shocks indicate the more persistent shocks an individual experienced, the stronger her support for redistribution will be).
Because the lack of natural experiments we can exploit and the fact that, to some extent, downward mobility experiences in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in the 1990s and early 2000s are beyond the control of any individual, we use regression-control strategies to estimate the effects of downward mobility on support for redistribution. We include all available individual-and household characteristics in LITS I as well as primary sampling unit (PSU) fixed effects in the regressions, the latter to control for time-invariant, both observed and unobserved, determinants of support for redistribution that may correlate with downward mobility. To the extent that downward mobility is exogenous conditional on these individualand household characteristics and the PSU fixed effects, a regression of support for redistribution on downward mobility and the control variables provides an unbiased estimate of the effects of downward mobility.
We find downward mobility increases support for redistribution, but only the more intensive one: Downward mobility experience in which an average individual had to respond by taking extreme measures increases support for redistribution by about three percent. We also find the timing and persistence of downward mobility matter: Recent bad years matter more than earlier bad years do; more persistence bad years matters more too. (One bad-year in the last four years during the period of analysis increases support for redistribution about three times as large as the average effect; experiencing nine bad-years or more increases support for redistribution by about 12-17 times larger than the average effect.) Our extensions and robustness checks (among others, by using alternative measure of support for redistribution;
analyzing another source of downward mobility, the recent global crisis; considering systematic biases in evaluating individual preferences; and assessing the severity of omitted variable bias problems) show these basic results are robust.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the empirical strategy and data.
Section III discusses the basic results; Section IV extensions and robustness checks. Section V concludes.
II. Empirical Strategy and Data
We use the regression-control strategy and estimate the following model:
where y ij is a measure of support for redistribution of individual i who lives in PSU j; D is a measure of downward mobility of individual i, X and Z are vectors of individual-and household characteristics, respectively; and ξ j and are PSU fixed effects and error terms, respectively.
We include all observed individual-and household past characteristics such as individual's age, gender, education, and household's size, which may correlate with downward mobility and support for redistribution, to make sure downward mobility is as random as possible. We also include PSU fixed effects to control for PSU time-invariant, both observed and unobserved, determinants of support for redistribution that may correlate with downward mobility such as cultural-specific determinants of support for redistribution and region-specific inclination towards economic reform. To the extent that downward mobility is random conditional on their individual-and household characteristics as well as PSU fixed effects, the coefficient of D in Equation (1) (1) the number of years an individual experienced any types of shocks during the 17-year period, (2) the number of years of labor market related shocks only, and (3) the number of years responded to hardships by taking extreme measures.
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To explore how timing and persistence of downward mobility affect support for redistribution, we also use other functions of the above measures of downward mobility. They are as follows: (1) We define the dependent variable, supports redistribution-an indicator equals one if an individual supports redistribution or zero otherwise-from a question on whether an individual thinks the state should strongly involve in "reducing the gap between the rich and the poor". As part of robustness checks, we also use alternative measures: whether an individual think the state should strongly involve in "guaranteeing employment" or "guaranteeing low prices for basic goods and food", and whether an individual agrees with the statement that "a market economy is preferable to any other form of economic system".
The individual and household characteristics we use as control variables are the number of adults in the household, the number of children in the household, gender, age, (For example, age enters as a set of dummies, one for each age cohort.) Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between support for redistribution and downward mobility. Each dot represents a country's average support for redistribution and the proportion of individuals in the country that experienced downward mobility defined by responded to shocks by taking extreme measures. The relationship is noisy, which suggests that other factors affect support for redistribution, but we still see a positive relationship between downward mobility and support for redistribution. That is the relationship that we want to examine after we make downward mobility as random as possible. We do not include these variables in most of our specifications because these variables can be also outcomes.
experienced downward mobility were more likely to work, trust people, and believe in efforts in 1989. There are some evidence that individuals who experienced downward mobility are more likely to support redistribution, though the differences may be insignificant statistically (Panel D). About 38 percent of respondents experienced shocks and responded by taking extreme measures; on average they had about six bad years (Panel E).
III. Empirical Results
We now discuss the results. Section A presents the basic results; Sections B and C include PSU-fixed effects as well as other control variables; Section D explores the effects of the timing and persistence of downward mobility on support for redistribution.
A. Basic Results Table 2 presents the basic results. Each column is a regression of supports redistribution on downward mobility with or without individual-and household characteristics as control variables, which include gender; age; education; religion; ethnic minority; relationship with household head; whether the household lives in a rural area, urban area or metropolitan city; the number of adults in the household; and the number of children. In columns 3-8 we use two other measures of downward mobility intensity. Using labor market related shocks only as a measure of downward mobility in columns 3-4, the estimates are small and insignificant statistically; but, using responded to shocks by taking extreme measures in columns 5-6, the estimates are larger than those in columns 1-2 and significant statistically. The estimate in column 6 shows having a bad-year increases the likelihood of supporting redistribution by 0.6 percentage point or about five percent. In the last two columns we include both responded-to-shocks-by-taking-extreme-measures and experienced-labor-market-shocks-only. The estimates of the first remain significant statistically, while those of the second do not. The magnitude of estimates of the first is also similar to that in columns 5-6.
B. Controlling for PSU Fixed Effects
Support for redistribution varies by country, which suggests that PSU-or country-specific factors affect how people think about redistribution. Grosjean (2011), for example, shows that cultural characteristics such as social trust in European countries evolves very slowly over time and vary across countries by the history of their imperial rule since centuries ago.
Moreover, individuals in different countries experienced different economic reforms, which depend on country-specific politics. Therefore, models we estimate in the previous sections, which ignore country-specific determinants of downward mobility and support for redistribution, may suffer from omitted variable bias problems.
In Table 3 , to control for these time-invariant factors, we include PSU-fixed effects in addition to the individual-and household characteristics. Overall, the estimates are similar to those in Table 2 . The estimate of responded to shocks by taking extreme measures is significant statistically; that of experienced labor market shocks only is not, both as the only measure of downward mobility in column 2 and with responded to shocks by taking extreme measures in column 4. The magnitude of the estimates is slightly smaller: The estimates in columns 3 and 4 suggest that, after controlling for PSU-fixed effects, a bad year increases support for redistribution by about 0.4 percentage point. These estimates mean a typical individual who responded to shocks by taking extreme measures is 3-4 percent more likely to support redistribution.
The results in Tables 2-3 suggest labor-market-related shocks, such as becoming unemployed or having a wage cut, do not necessarily increase support for redistribution.
However, if the shocks are severe so that people have to respond by taking extreme measures such as cutting down on food consumption or selling household assets, experiencing these shocks does increase support for redistribution.
In the rest of the analyses, for brevity, we will present the estimates of downward mobility defined as responded to shocks by taking extreme measures only.
C. Controlling for Other Characteristics
The results are robust even after controlling for the PSU-fixed effects, but because we use control strategy as a method of identification, there are always a possibilities that the models suffer from omitted variable bias. Therefore, in Table 4 , we include other past individual and parental characteristics as additional controls. In some specifications, we also include current individual characteristics such as current job characteristics and household spending to see whether the direct effects of downward mobility on support for redistribution are large.
In column 2 we include individual characteristics in 1989 as additional controls, i.e., job status in 1989, the position along a ten-step economic ladder, the degree of trust in people, and the belief on whether effort and hard work as well as intelligence and skills are the most important to succeed in life. In column 3 we add father characteristics (education level of the father, job status, and whether he is a member of a communist party) further, in column 4 the same set of characteristics of the mother as well. The estimates are 0.4-0.5, similar to that in column 1, which is from a regression without the additional controls. They also remain significant statistically.
We then include current individual characteristics in columns 5-7. In column 5 we include an indicator of whether an individual worked in 2006, in column 6 we add job characteristics (a full set of dummies for types of occupations, industry, and whether selfemployed) and the logarithm of household spending in 2006-the estimates do not change much. In column 7 we include a set of individual characteristics in 2006 (i.e., the position along a ten-step economic ladder, the degree of trust in people, and the belief on whether effort and hard work as well as intelligence and skills are the most important to succeed in life). The estimate falls to 0.3 though remain large and significant statistically. Even after we include individual characteristics in 2006 in the regression, which muddle the estimation of total effects of downward mobility, we still find that downward mobility experiences increase support for redistribution. Table 4 shows that overall the basic results are robust: One bad year increases support for redistribution by 0.4-0.5 percentage point. Even after controlling for current individual characteristics in 2006, the estimates remain large economically and significant statistically, which indicate that downward mobility also directly affects support for redistribution, not only through its effects on current employment status and current beliefs in efforts, hard work, and luck.
In the rest of the analyses, to get the total effects of downward mobility on support for redistribution, we exclude these current individual characteristics as additional independent variables. 11 To keep most individuals in the sample, we do not include the additional individual characteristics in 1989 either. 12 We, therefore, will regress a measure of support for redistribution on a measure of downward mobility and a set of basic control variables, i.e., gender; age; education; religion; ethnic minority; relationship with household head; whether the household lives in a rural area, urban area or metropolitan city; the number of adults in the household; the number of children; and PSU fixed effects.
D. Timing and Persistence of Downward Mobility
In Tables 2-4 we assume a bad year has the same effects regardless of whether it happened a long time ago and whether they happened consecutively-we ignore the timing and persistence of hardships. In Table 5 we relax this assumption in four ways: (1) These current characteristics are bad controls because they can be also outcomes (Angrist and Piscke, 2009). 12 In column 2, after controlling for additional individual characteristics in 1989, the number of observations falls from 27 thousands to about 19 thousands. After controlling for parental characteristics in column 4, it falls further to 17 thousand observations. 13 Including the additional past characteristics does not change the results. They are available from the authors upon request. 14 We actually use two eight-or-nine-year periods and four four-or-five-year periods, but we will call these two eight-year periods or four four-year periods for brevity. 
IV. Extensions and Robustness Checks
In this section we show some extensions and robustness checks. Tables 7 and 8 analyze the effects by group of individuals and group of countries; Tables 9 and 10 use alternative measures of support for redistribution and downward mobility; Table 11 examines another source of shocks, the recent economic crisis; Tables 12 consider biased perception of individual's relative position in income distribution; and Table 13 examines whether unobservable factors undermine the OLS estimations.
A. Interactions between Downward Mobility and Individual Characteristics Table 6 presents the interactions between individual characteristics and downward mobility.
The estimates of downward mobility are positive and significant statistically; they are also quite stable across all specifications. We find that females and non-college graduates are more likely to support redistribution, which are in line with papers in this line of literature. We also find that individuals who are 50 years old or older, those who believed in efforts in 1989, and those who trusted people in 1989 are more likely to support redistribution, which seem to be in contrast with the findings in the literature. 15 Considering that these are individual characteristics in the past, the results are perhaps unsurprising because some people had experienced downward mobility since then and may have changed their beliefs in efforts and people in 2006 when the survey was done, which in turn affect their support for redistribution.
None of the interaction terms is significant statistically, however, except the interaction between college graduates and downward mobility.
B. Analyses by Groups of Individuals and Groups of Countries
In previous analyses, we implicitly assume the control variables affect different groups of individuals similarly. In Table 7 we relax this assumption by estimating the effects of downward mobility by group of individuals, i.e., gender, older than 50 years, has college degrees, high on the ten-step economic ladder in 1989, a member of ethnic minority, believed in efforts in 1989, trusted people in 1989, and father was a member of communist party.
Overall, the results are robust. All estimates are positive: They vary from 0.2 to 0.6 percentage point. They are also significant statistically except for individuals who were high on the ten-step economic ladder in 1989 and those whose fathers are members of communist 15 See, for examples, Fong (2001) , Corneo and Gruner (2002) , Alesina and Glaeser (2004) , Alesina and La Ferrera (2005) , and Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007).
parties. There seems to be similar effects across groups, though some groups (i.e., individuals who were older than 50 years, college graduates, low on the ten-step economic ladder in 1989, members of ethnic minorities, and not believers in efforts in 1989 as well as those whose fathers were members of communist parties) are more likely to support redistribution.
In Table 8 we estimate the effects of downward mobility by group of countries. The effect is the largest in EU countries (0.8 percentage point); it is the lowest in non CIS and EU countries (column 3). The latter, though it remains positive, is insignificant statistically.
C. Use of Alternative Measures of Support for Redistribution and Downward Mobility
So far, we have been using the question on whether state should reduce income gap as measure of support for redistribution. In Table 9 , we consider alternative dependent variables:
whether state should guarantee employment, whether state should guarantee low prices of basic goods, whether poverty is caused by injustice in society, and whether market economy is not preferable. All estimates are positive and significant statistically; they vary from 0.2 to 0.8 percentage point. Table 10 shows the results using alternatives measures of downward mobility: whether an individual's household has moved down the ten-step economic ladder since 1989, one's life is worse than most high school classmates', life is worse than parents', and children are expected to have worse future. All estimates are positive and significant statistically.
Economically they are also large. The estimate in column 1, for example, shows having moved down the economic ladder since 1989 increases support for redistribution by four percentage points. Moreover, not only that past downward mobility increases support for redistribution, expectation of future downward mobility experienced by children does too as column 5 shows: Being pessimistic on ones' children future increases support for redistribution by five percentage points. When we include past and future downward mobility in column 6, the estimates remain similar.
D. Analysis of Downward Mobility Experienced During the Recent Economic Crisis
We now look at the effects of downward mobility caused by other sources of shocks, i.e., the recent economic crisis in 2007-08, using LITS II. Table 11 presents the results. We use three measures of supports distribution (i.e., income should be more equal, poverty is caused by injustice in society, and market economy is not preferable) and three measures of downward mobility (i.e., affected much by the crisis, responded to shocks by taking extreme measures, and responding to crisis by taking some measures). We find all estimates are positive and significant statistically. The estimates are economically large, in particular when we use whether poverty is caused by injustice in society as the measure of support for redistribution in columns 4-6: Affected much by the economic crisis in column 4, for example, increases support for redistribution by eight percentage points; responded to crisis by taking some extreme measures, which is similar to the measure we use in the basic results, in column 5 increases support for redistribution by ten percentage points.
E. Analyses of Individuals Whose Actual and Perceived Incomes Are Matched
Cruces, Perez-Trugliain and Tetaz (2013) show that people have biased perception of their relative position in income distribution: Some people say they are poor when in fact their incomes are higher than average; some say they are richer than average when their incomes are actually low. 17 In Table 12 we check whether these biased perceptions of incomes may compromise our results. In column 1, we include only individuals whose perceived position in a ten-step economic ladder and actual decile-group of household spending are matched. In columns 2-4 we also include individuals whose biases are at most one-, two, and three decilegroups, respectively. Overall, the results are robust. The estimates are all positive, about 0.4-0.5 percentage point, and significant statistically.
F. Testing for the Effect of Unobserved Factors
Finally, we check how severe omitted bias problems affect our main results. We use a statistic Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) develop using selection on observables to estimate the potential bias from unobservables, the ratio R= � � − � , which indicates how much stronger the selection on unobservables, relative to selection on observables, needs to be to explain away the estimated effect of the past events on redistributive preferences. Table 13 provides the ratios, which we calculate using the baseline estimates in Table   2 . We define full model as regressions with the individual-and household characteristics and restricted model as those without the control variables. For estimates in Table 2 , the ratios of all models are over three except column 2, with an average value of R to be around three. This implies, on average the selection on unobservables has to be at least three times stronger than the selection of observables to explain away the estimated regression coefficients of the past events on attitudes towards redistribution. Thus, it is plausible to assume that it is unlikely the estimates are affected by the omitted variable bias.
V. Conclusion
Downward mobility increases support for redistribution, but only if it is severe: There is no evidence that being unemployed increases support for redistribution; being unemployed and responding to the shocks by taking extreme measures does-one year of the latter type increases support for redistribution by about 3 percent. The timing of downward mobility matters too (recent bad years matter more than earlier bad years do), so does its persistence (more persistent shocks matter more than occasional ones.) For example, one bad year in the most recent four years increases support for redistribution about three times as large as the average effect; experiencing nine bad years or more increases support for redistribution by about 12-17 times larger than the average effect.
These basic results are robust to systematic biases that people may have when they evaluate their preferences for redistribution (Cruces, Perez-Trugliain and Tetaz, 2013) ; measurement errors in people's subjective responses toward redistribution (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004; Fong, 2006) ; and the possibility that our specifications suffer from large omitted variable bias problems, which may compromise our OLS estimates (Altonji, Elder, and Taber, 2005) . The results are also robust to alternative measures of support for redistribution, alternative measures of downward mobility, and other sources of economic shocks.
Many papers, such as Alesina and La Ferrara (2001) and Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) , have provided the empirical evidence for Piketty's (1995) learning model, but we believe this paper still contributes to the literature. One, we provide a richer picture of how mobility experiences shape individual preferences towards redistributive policies. Two, we
show that support for redistribution is not static or sluggish; rather it responds to severe, recent, and persistent mobility experiences. Three, we highlight the importance of the particulars of downward mobility experiences, their intensity, timing, and persistence as determinants of support for redistribution, which calls for a refinement of Piketty's (1995) learning model.
A limitation of this paper is that our measures of downward mobility are not exogenous. If there is an unobserved factor that positively correlates with both downward mobility and support for redistribution (for example, if people who are more likely to be unemployed are also more likely to support redistribution), our OLS estimates will be too big.
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